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OF PSYCHOPATHS AND PENDULUMS: LEGAL AND
PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS IN
THE UNITED STATES
SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL, J.D.* and JAMES L. CAVANAUGH, JR., M.D.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the risk of being accused of derivative theorizing or other academic pedantry,
it seems appropriate in any introduction to the topic of how society has treated sex
offenders to invoke the so-called pendulum effect.' It is a concept or characteristic
that appears to be especially pertinent to our Anglo-American political traditions
and our common-law driven legal culture. The pendulum designation is intended to
describe the fact that the law on any one social issue or problem is often given to
dramatic back-and-forth fluctuations. Whether those fluctuations occur over shorter
or longer periods, and whether they are seen to reflect broad socio-political changes
or more ephemeral events and shifts in public attitude (or even a mere instantaneous
attitudinal upheaval caused by a single explosive event), the end result is the same:
after all is said and done, after all the socio-political commotion and all the legal
revving up and stops and starts, things wind up pretty much back where they were
in the first place. The law or legal regime in effect some 20 or 40 or 50 years ago
is suddenly in vogue again and, borne by a wave of historical amnesia (peculiar to
Americans?) that is no more feigned than it is conscious, gets adopted as the latest
in reformist jurisprudence. Sometimes this process repeats several times over the
course of a few decades, suggesting that rather than linear, legal progress is more
often circular in trajectory-like the proverbial wheel of our innocent reinventions.
It is old news that the field of law known as mental health law is especially
susceptible to these pendulum-like shifts.2 Its tendency to lurch from one positional
extreme to the other may be due to the field's interdisciplinary character, which
leaves legislatures and courts, not to mention the public, often befuddled about the
vagaries of a science (in many respects still an infant science, even psychiatrists
must, and sometimes do, acknowledge) whose theories are not always easy to grasp
by outsiders and whose relevance to legal methods and objectives is not always
clear Assuming this to be the case generally, it is the specific contention and a
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1. The pendulum notion in law is old enough and common enough not to require a particular source
citation. Suffice it to say it was bandied about even in the distant days when the first-named writer was in law
school.
2. See Samuel J. Brakel, Legal Schizophrenia and The Mental Health Lawyer: Recent Trends in Civil

Commitment Law, 6 BEHAv. Sd. & L 3 (1988).
3. Legal cases are filled with pronouncements regarding the vagaries-especially for legal purposes-of
psychiatric observations, conceptualizations, classifications and terminology. The outcomes of the cases are often
influenced by this sense of imprecision and lack of fit. One of the better, among numerous possible examples is
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), where Chief Justice Burger wrote at length about the "lack of certainty
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major theme of this paper that the law's treatment of people whose (mental
health?)4 problem is that they deviate from sexual norms presents a veritable casestudy of this pendulum phenomenon. Going through some of the history of law and
psychiatry's treatment of sex offenders in the U.S., one cannot help but note that
where we are today compared to yesterday is, in many respects, a case of "deja vu
all over again."
II.

THE EARLY HISTORY (PRE-1930): UNDIFFERENTIATED
TREATMENT
An early history of sex offender treatment in the U.S. is non-existent, in the sense
that up until the late 1930s sex offenders received no special treatment. People who
committed crimes of a sexual nature were dealt with like all other offenders.5 The
assignation of blame and punishment, typically via criminal conviction and
incarceration, was the chief goal and, to the extent deterrence (specific or general)
figured into the criminal justice calculus of the time, its aim could be achieved by
the same correctional dispositions.6 Sterilization of sex offenders may have been a
punitive option in a number of states, but the laws that might have been read to
authorize this were aimed primarily at mentally deficient individuals and their
rationale was more likely to be founded in eugenics. 7
It was not until the early part of this century that things began to change. This
was the dawning of a new rehabilitation-focused era in the U.S., distinguished by
a turning toward medical explanations for criminal behavior' and an orientation
toward treatment goals over punishment, best achieved via indeterminate
confinements, whether in prisons or treatment institutions, whose end would be
premised on the offender's demonstrated recovery rather than one arbitrary pre-set
sentence limit or another. Initially, sex offenders were still lumped with other
groups of offenders under
laws designed to deal with "defective delinquents" and
"criminal psychopaths," 9 but soon special sex offender or sexual psychopath
statutes began to make their appearance in progressive jurisdictions, separating for
legal purposes sexually deviant behavior from criminal behavior derived from other

and the fallability" and (more generously) the "subtleties and nuances" of psychiatric diagnosis to support the
conclusion that the standard of proof in civil commitment cases need only be "clear and convincing" evidence as
distinct from the more exacting criminal law standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt."
4. The emphasis should be on the question mark after "mental health," as that is the focus of much of the
controversy, especially today's controversy, regarding the law's treatment of sex offenders.
5. See SAMUEL J. BRAKEL & RONALD S.ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 341 (A.B.A. rev.

ed. 1971).
6. See id.
7. See id. at 210.
8. See generally ANDREW VON HIRScH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); Francis
A. Allen, CriminalJustice, Legal Values, and the RehabilitationIdeal, 50 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 226 (1959);
R. Lieb et al.,
Sexual Predatorsand Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43 (1998).
9. See generally The Sexual Psychopath and the Law (and accompanying statutory tables) in BRAKEL &
ROCK, supra note 5,at 341-375. Massachusetts was the first state to enact one of these generic defective
delinquent/criminal psychopath laws, as early as 1911 (1911 Mass. Acts Chap. 595, §§ 1-12). Pennsylvania passed
a similarly-oriented statute in 1933 (1933 Pa. Laws No. 78, §§ 1-4). Maryland and Connecticut soon also took this
approach. See id. at 342. These broad, seemingly archaic statutes have in fact outlived the bulk of the more
specifically focused sex offender statutes; Maryland's Defective Delinquent Act was not repealed until 1989, while
Connecticut's is still on the books as Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17a-566.
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characterological or biological deficits. The fact that there may also have been an
undercurrent of punitive and preventive motives does not take away the essential
therapeutic intent of this special legislation.
I.

THE MIDDLE PERIOD (1930-1970): HEYDAY OF THE SEXUAL
PSYCHOPATH LAWS
Though Minnesota is sometimes identified as the state where the movement
toward treatment of sex offenders via special sexual psychopath statutes originated,
a couple of other midwestern states-Michigan and Illinois-were in fact the first
to pass these laws (1937-1938).' ° Minnesota followed shortly, as did Ohio and
Wisconsin in the Midwest and California and Massachusetts at opposite sides of the
country's coastal extremes (1939-1940)." The reason for the notoriety of
Minnesota's statute is that it generated the first constitutional test of this type of
legislation before the U.S. Supreme Court-a test whose result paved the way for
legislative activity for the next decade or two to come.
Minnesota ex. rel. Pearsonv. Probate Court2 is a rather poor vehicle for such
legislative tone and trend setting, but that doesn't alter the reality. The main
challenge to the Minnesota statute was that its key term, "psychopathic personality,"
to designate the targeted population was too vague and indefinite to pass
constitutional muster. In disposing of this contention, the U.S. Supreme Court was
helped by the fact that in the course of the case's progress through the appellate
process, the Minnesota Supreme Court had been good enough to construct a more
pointed definition that alluded to the population's "habitual course of misconduct
in sexual matters" and their "utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses,"
leading to the likely infliction of "injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of
their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire."' 3 Finding the statute no longer vague,
the Court had no trouble with the petitioner's secondary, equal protection challenge
either. It simply said-in a classic case of substituting conclusion for argumentthat there was "no reason for doubt" that the legislature's selection of the targeted
class had a "rational basis."' 4
The Supreme Court's decision reflected, as well as bolstered, the general
optimism that prevailed in relevant circles about the ability to identify and treat
those among the amorphous aggregation of sex offenders who would benefit from
the ministrations of the sexual psychopath laws. Within another decade-plus, more

10. See F.T. LINDMAN & D.M. MclNTynt, JR., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 302-03 (1961);
SAMuEL J. BRAKEL ET AL, ThE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 739-40 (3rd ed. 1985).
11. See supra note 10.
12. 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
13. See id. at 273. Not that the statute itself was all that vague. It defined psychopathic personality as:
the existenqe in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of
behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the
consequences of his acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render such person
irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other
persons.
Id. (citing 1939 Minn. Laws Ch. 369, § 1)
14. See id. at 274.
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than half the states had passed similar legislation. 5 And it was used to substantial,
if varying, degrees state-by-state. Selected figures indicate that Indiana used its
sexual psychopath law more than 450 times in the decade stretching roughly from
1955-1965.16 In the mid-1960s, California committed an average of some 800 sex
offenders per year;" and Wisconsin, deliberately operating under a restrictive
application of its statute, lest its treatment resources be overwhelmed, averaged
between 140 and 150 offenders in residence at its Sex Crimes Facility during the
same period (estimates were that a more natural interpretation of the law would
generate a caseload of some 400, well above the institution's capacity).18
In contrast to other mental health areas where law and psychiatry sometimes
seem to be working at cross-purposes if not engaged in active war, there was
substantial consensus both within and among the disciplines regarding the workings
and objectives of the statutes.' 9 The rehabilitative ideal behind the laws was widely
shared, and its implementation via indeterminate institutionalization in treatment
facilities in lieu of imprisonment went essentially unchallenged.' Wishful thinking
and the absence of contrary scientific evidence made it easy for doctors and lawyers
alike to accept the optimism regarding the law's selection and treatment capacities.
The procedural shortcuts permitted by most of the statutes could be winked at, given
the benign intentions and predicted good outcomes. And the fact that some statutes
followed a pre-conviction model (i.e., a sex-related criminal charge sufficed to
trigger the statute's operation), while others were drafted along post-conviction
lines raised few noticeable concerns. 21 Both models could be justified by appealing
to values that, even if opposing, were not mutually exclusive. Pre-conviction
statutes facilitated the desirable end of early intervention (concededly at the expense
of some degree of certainty regarding accuracy of selection), while post-conviction
statutes, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the subject was indeed a
sex offender, put a premium on proper identification (even if in the process it
delayed intervention and treatment).
That, at least, was the way it was in the early, heady years of the sexual
psychopath law era. Eventually, this consensus would break down between the two
disciplines, as lawyers began to challenge the statutes' increasingly perceived
substantive and procedural shortcomings.' Rifts developed between doctors of a
continuing paternalist/optimist/best interest bent and lawyers of typically more
autonomist/pessimist/legalist orientation. These rifts would not disappear until the
development, much later, of an altogether different consensus, this one against the
procedures and objectives of the laws.23

15. See BRAKEL & RoCK, supra note 5,at 341.
16. See id. at 348 n.59.
17. See id.

18. See id.
19. See, e.g., Edwin H. Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 547

(1950).
20.
21.
22.
23.

See BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 5,at 347.
See id.
See id. at 347-48.
See infra Part V. for a discussion of the new generation of Sexually Violent Predator laws.
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IV.

DEMISE OF THE SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH LAWS AND THE
REHABILITATIVE IDEAL
The idea that there was a category of offenders called sexual psychopaths, who
could be rationally and consistently separated from other individuals exhibiting
criminal or merely sexually deviant behavior, and who could be successfully
treated, did not withstand the test of practical experience and advancing scientific
theory.' The cracks that first developed between legal and medical practitioners on
this front soon also led to the loss of intra-disciplinary confidence in the laws.2 5
Gradually, it became clear to many mental health practitioners as well that the
scientific/medical underpinnings that supported the earlier habilitative optimism and
the laws it generated were weak indeed. As these supports collapsed, so did the
laws. Several complementary social trends aided the implosion, such as the
movements towards racial equality and more broadly applicable civil rights. Later,
and perhaps paradoxically, the collapse was aided by a societal turn toward "lawand-order" policies and a more punitive (as opposed to compassionate/
rehabilitation-oriented) public mindset. By the mid-1980s, more than half of the
states that once had sexual psychopath laws had thrown them out and the clamor for
further repeals continued. 6 The chorus included lawyer groups such as the
American Bar Association's Committee on Criminal Justice Mental Health
Standards, medical entities such as the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry,
and interdisciplinary political bodies such as the President's Commission on Mental
Health.27 Where the laws survived (for the time being) they often fell into disuse;
half-way into the decade from 1980 to 1990, only five states-Massachusetts,
Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon and Washington-still applied their law with any
appreciable frequency. In Florida, all involuntary applications of the law were
suspended and only voluntary patients, albeit a large group, remained in the state's
treatment program.2"
The legal pressure to do away with the sexual psychopath statutes came from the
courts, though the message was typically somewhat indirect. The leading U.S.
2 9 While the
Supreme Court case of this era is Specht v. Patterson.
challenge in
Specht to the law (of Colorado in this instance) was procedural, the Court's decision
signaled the end of the judicial hands-off policy that had until then saved the
statutes from both procedural and substantive scrutiny.' Refusing to go along with
the state's contention that post-conviction commitment under the statute was akin
to a sentencing decision requiring little formal process, and dismissing as irrelevant
the state's characterization of the law as civil rather than criminal, the Court
mandated the application of most, if not all, of the procedural safeguards of a
criminal trial: a full judicial hearing, assistance of counsel, the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses, the right to present one's own witnesses and

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 5, at 348-57.
See id.
See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 10, at 740.
See id. at 743.
See id. at 740 & n.557.
386 U.S. 605 (1967).
See id.
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evidence, and a final decision sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful review
on appeal.31
Much later, in a test of the Illinois law in Allen v. Illinois, 2 in which incidentally
the discredited civil/criminal distinction was given new life, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination privilege did not
necessarily extend to the psychiatric examination designed to inform the
commitment process. 33 But by then, the procedural complications mandated by
Specht, combined with doubts about treatment efficacy, 34 had had their effect. The
Illinois law was then one of only 15-odd remaining special sex offender statutes, 5
jurisprudential dinosaurs that were rarely used, 6 and themselves already
encumbered by every procedural hurdle other than the self-incrimination bar. In
short, U.S. jurisprudence regarding sex offenders was close to where it was before
the whole sexual psychopath law experiment began: back to undifferentiated,
criminal treatment, rejection of special rehabilitative goals or methods for sex
offenders, and incarceration of sex offenders in prisons, sometimes under habitual
criminal statutes permitting extra-long sentences.
THE NEW ERA (1990-): ENACTMENT OF A NEW GENERATION OF
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS
Among the disparate forces that combined to end the sexual psychopath law
era-many of them not merely well-intentioned but also well-informed-there was
also an element whose persuasive tactics seemed to rest heavily on the spread of
misinformation. The essence of its message was the minimization of sexually
deviant behavior as a problem. Instead, the onus was placed on society at large, the
bulk of whose allegedly puritanical members were said to be given to hysterical
overreaction to anything that smacked of unconventional sexual behavior or tastes.
Even when it came to offenders, the public's perceptions regarding their recidivism
potential and dangerousness were purportedly greatly overwrought. The true facts
were that sex offenders were among the "lowest [of] repeaters," "[c]areful studies
of large samples" of these offenders "show that most of them get in trouble only
once," while the impact of sex attacks on victims had been "grossly exaggerated...
the possible traumatizing of the individual [being] almost always a product of
cultural and individual responses to the experience rather than because of the
intrinsic emotional value of that experience itself." 37 And so on. One of the
V.

31. See id. at 609-610.
32. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
33. See id. at 375.
34. See, e.g., Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (intimating that committed sex offenders
had a right to treatment).
35. See BRAKELErAL.,supra note 10, at 740.
36. There were about five commitments per year in Illinois at this time. Telephone interview with Michael
G. Howie, Forensic Services, Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (today the
Office of Mental Health, Department of Human Services) (1993).
37. Paul W. Tappan, Some Myths About the Sex Offender, 19 FED. PROBATION 7, 8 (1955). A recent,
specific response to Tappan can be found in Jean Peters-Baker, Challenging TraditionalNotions of Managing Sex
Offenders: Prognosisis Lifetime Management,66 UMKC L REV. 629 (1998) (stating "[u]ndoubtedly, the notion
that sex crimes are isolated behaviors is pitifully inaccurate."). For an impassioned, feminist-style indictment of
society's and the law's historically inadequate response to the crime of rape, see Susan Stefan, The Protection
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minimizers saw fit to implicitly criticize the passage of Indiana's sex offender
statute as "the direct result of almost a mass hysteria following a series of [sexually
motivated] murders which occurred in the summer and fall of 1947,""3 as if several
murders in the space of a few months in a few counties were nothing to be alarmed
about.
These false facts and flawed judgments did not serve well the cause of devising
sound public policy and they would come to haunt the so-called progressive forces
in later years. After all, minimizing a real problem does not make it go away any
more than the disappearance of a certain set of sex offender laws will cause sex
offenders to disappear. In 1989, reality caught up with myth in the state of
Washington in the form of a man by the name of Earl Shriner who, having just been
released from a ten-year prison sentence for kidnapping and sexually assaulting two
teenage girls, and found not to be committable under the state's civil commitment
statute, proceeded to rape a seven-year old boy and, after cutting off the boy's penis,
left him to die.39 The case galvanized the public and the state's legislators who,
sharing in the general outrage that such a man could be on the loose and allowed to
prey on young victims, passed (in 1990) the first of a new generation of sex
offender laws known as Sexually Violent Predator Acts.' Soon other states, driven
in some cases by similarly horrifying sex crimes, followed suit. Today, thirteen or
fourteen states in the U.S., in addition to Washington, have enacted laws of this
kind including: Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Wisconsin. 4
In twelve other states, such legislation is pending with action expected in the

Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, PsychiatricLabeling, and Law, 88 Nw. U. L REV. 1271 (1994); see also Robert
A. Prentky et al., Recidivism Rates Among ChildMolesters and Rapists: A MethodologicalAnalysis, 21 LAW &
HUMAN BEHAv. 635 (1997).
38. Elias S. Cohen, Administrationof the CriminalSexual PsychopathStatute in Indiana,32 IND. LJ.450,
451 (1957).
39. See John Leo, Changingthe Rules of a Deadly Game, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 1996, at
21. The Shriner case has featured prominently in the debate on legislative action regarding sex offenders ever since
it spurred the Washington legislature to take the first big step--enactment of its Sexually Violent Predator law in
1990. See, e.g., David Boemer, Confronting Violence: In the Act and the Word, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L REV. 525
(1992); John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent PredatorLaw: A DeliberateMisuse of the Therapeutic
State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L REv. 655 (1992); Kimberly A. Dorsett, Kansas v. Hendricks:
Marking the Beginning of a DangerousNew Era in Civil Commitment, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 113 (1998). Written
eight years after the Washington enactment, the last article opens, melodramatically, with: "The nation gasped in
horror over the story of Earl Shriner." l; see also Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionalityand Morality of
Civilly Committing Violent Sexual Predators,15 U. PuGET SOUND L REV. 709 (1992). This article is found in
Predatorsand Politics:A Symposium on Washington's Sexually Violent PredatorsStatute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND
L REV. 507 (hereinafter Symposium), which also published the Boemer and LaFond articles. Brooks' article is one
of the more dispassionate pieces, and one of the few in support of the SVP laws.
40. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09 (West 1992).
41. ARIZ.REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701 (West Supp. 1999); CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 (West 1998);
FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 916.31 (Supp. 1998); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207 (West Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5929a01 (1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A (West Supp. 1999); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.185 (West 1998);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.475 (West Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.24 (West Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 25-03.1 (1995); OR. REV. STAT. §426.005 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-10 (West Supp. 1998); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 980.01 (West 1998). Lists of this type vary, depending on the categorizations employed, as some
states have mixed the SVP approach with older Sexually Dangerous Persons (SDP) provisions or with their civil
commitment schemes. See infra note 43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the steps taken by the New
Jersey legislature.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

coming legislative session, including in such large populous states as Michigan,
Ohio and Pennsylvania.42
A Quick Digression:RegistrationProvisions
As early as 1994 New Jersey was sometimes listed among the still small, but
rapidly growing, number of states that had adopted the SVP approach for dealing
with repetitive, predatory sexual misconduct. 43 Some other analysts disagreed,
asserting that a better categorization of what the New Jersey legislature
accomplished (in 1994) was a liberalization of its civil commitment law to
specifically include offenders whose conduct is characterized by a "pattern of
repetitive, compulsive behavior."' By removing the focus from the (presumed,
though formally unstated) requirement of proving psychotic behavior in order to
commit, the legislature certainly meant to make it easier for sex offenders to
qualify. Given that the law also specifically targeted sex offenders nearing the end
of their confinement term4 5 -i.e., an already incarcerated population-the
legislation had a lot in common with the classic SVP approach. It may have taken
some excessively fine conceptual hairsplitting to nevertheless refuse to classify
New Jersey's scheme as such. The point is moot today, because in 1998 New Jersey
passed a separate and uncontrovertably new generation sexually violent predators
law.46
New Jersey has, since 1994, had a sex offender registration law that clearly is
separate. Known as Megan's Law,47 after the young victim (Megan Kanka) of a
notorious, fatal sex crime that presumably would have been prevented had strict
registration/notification requirements been in effect, this New Jersey statute is
merely the most conspicuous of similar laws that exist today in every state in the
U.S. Many of these registration laws predate the current legal preoccupation with
sex offenders and the harms they may commit, though a substantial number of them
have been retooled and refined to respond to today's heightened concern. At a
minimum, these registration laws require a convicted sex offender to register with
local law enforcement authorities in the locality where he currently resides or has
recently moved. 4 Administrators of institutions that house and eventually release
sex offenders are under concomitant notification obligations.49 Providing for wider
dissemination of, and access to, the information given to law enforcement agencies
is usually part of the laws' scheme, with the ultimate breadth of the disclosure (e.g.,
to child-care centers, schools, the public at large) typically dependent on the nature

A.

42. See W. LAWRENCE FITCH, SEX OFFENDER COMMrrrMENT INTHE UNITED STATES tbl. 1 (Maryland
Mental Hygiene Administration, Oct. 1999). The stampede is not universal, however, as Fitch's Update also reports
that SVP legislation was defeated or withdrawn in the last two years in 21 states, including in five where it is listed
as currently pending (by virtue of having been reintroduced). The Fitch material also lists Virginia as a recent
addition to the list of states with SVP legislation. See id.
43. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.4 (West 1997).
44. Id. § 30:4-82.4b(l).
45. See id. § 30:4-82.4 a & b.
46. See id § 30:4-27.24 (West Supp. 1999). So as to leave no doubt, the statute opens with the statement
that "[tihis act shall be known and cited as the 'New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act."' Id.
47. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 1997).
48. See, e.g., id. § 2C:7-2.
49. See, e.g., id. § 2C:7-3.
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and severity of the individual's offense, his criminal history, and psychological or
psychiatric profile.5 0 There is even a federal law, which goes by the distinctly
ungainly name of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Registration Program, 5 that seeks to induce the states to meet
certain federally favored standards, criteria, procedures and sanctions in the
operation of their registration laws--on the pain of losing 10%
52 of the federal crimefighting funds that would otherwise be allocated to them.
CentralElements of the SVP Laws
Sexually violent predator acts often contain registration/notification provisions
pertinent to those who are released during or after processing under the statutes, 53
but these are pale, SVP-specific (if not redundant) copies of the independent
registration laws. What marks the SVP acts as distinctive legislation are the
following central features: (1) their stated purpose is to detain, in fact, to continue
to detain, sex offenders who are already in custody and who are likely to reoffend
if set free; and (2) their continued detention objective is accomplished via civil
commitment to a treatment facility. The acts are different from the old sex offender
(psychopath) laws to the extent that the latter prescribed treatment instead of
incarceration. They are the same as the old laws in their use of the civil commitment
route and their appeal to the treatment rationale to achieve/justify their purpose.
B.

C. Preamble Provisions
Typical of the new SVP laws is that they contain a preamble of legislative
findings that, in articulating the laws' purpose, at the same time acknowledge (even
highlight) some of their conceptual weaknesses. Washington's introductory
provision, which serves as the model for comparable preambles in the statutes of
other states, puts it this way:
The legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually
violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders
them appropriate for the existing involuntary treatment act, . . . which is
intended to be a short-term civil commitment system that is primarily designed
to provide short-term treatment to individuals with serious mental disorders and
then return them to the community. In contrast. . . , sexually violent predators
generally have antisocial personality features which are not amenable to existing
mental illness treatment modalities and those features render them likely to
engage in sexually violent behavior.'
While this language explains the need for the new legislation, it also comes
perilously close to admitting, as opponents of the legislation have noted, that the
population targeted for its treatment mandates is, by most conventional standards,
neither mentally ill nor treatable. As for the alleged small size of the committable

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See id. § 2C:7-8.
42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994).
See id. § 14071(A)(2).
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.120 (West 1992).
Id. at § 71.09.010.
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population, a skeptic might respond with: "How do we know? Who will assure
this?"
D. Basic Definitions,Reach and Timing of the Laws
The statutes all provide specific definitions of the population intended to come
within their ambit. Kansas' law, selected here because it received special attention
from the U.S. Supreme Court in the course of the Hendricks litigation (but
otherwise unexceptional), defines a sexually violent predator as: "any person who
has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely
to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence."" It then follows with this
definition of mental abnormality: "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually
violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and
safety of others. 56
Even those of nonjudgmental bent can detect an essential circularity, a
tautological element, in this definitional scheme-the law's triggering condition
stated in terms of the behavior it produces. They may also find an excess of legal
(forensic) convenience in the definitions. For example, the stipulation that the
mental abnormality condition can be either congenital or acquired certainly "covers
all the bases"--to use a metaphor from the same source drawn on earlier-but one
need not be a cynic to suspect that the legislature's selection of this broad coverage
had to do with more than just clinical dictates.
The primary intent of the SVP laws is, as noted, to reach presently confined
offenders who, even though not rehabilitated, are about to be released. The vast
majority of this designated population are prisoners convicted of sex or sex-related
crimes. However, the laws also apply to individuals charged who have not been
tried because they are incompetent to stand trial (but who are nevertheless due for
release), as well as to those found not guilty by reason of insanity but no longer
subject to institutionalization, and to juveniles adjudicated delinquent on the basis
of a sexually violent offense." Typically, the laws provide for the commitment
process to be initiated 90 days prior to the offender's anticipated discharge.5" The
fact that many of these offenders will have spent substantial time in custody without
any treatment mandate (or, for that matter, the benefit of voluntary treatment) is
among the features that drive critics to brand the SVP laws as hypocritical.59 But,
much as some may wish to the contrary, standard jurisprudence does not as yet
equate insincerity with unconstitutionality.

55. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030 (West Supp. 1999).
58. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/10(b) (West Supp. 1999) ("3 months prior to ... the
anticipated release from"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a) (Supp. 1998) ("90 days prior to"); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 71.09.030 (West Supp. 1999) ("[w]hen it appears that.. . [t]he sentence ... is about to expire").
59. See Symposium supra note 39. Much of the talk at the many conferences held on the subject suggests
that the laws are bad because they are hypocritical.
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The Processand Some Implementation Data
No doubt owing to the legacy of the old Specht v. Patterson60 ruling (durable
enough still after 32 years), the new SVP laws are heavy on procedural safeguards
for those for whom commitment is sought. The process they prescribe is multi-step.
First, prison officials or authorities of any other agencies housing offenders must
conduct an evaluation of all sex- or sexually motivated offenders in the short,
statutorily designated period before their release date.61 Though the statutes may
speak of a "comprehensive evaluation,"'62 this first step is in effect a rough screen
to determine if there is enough in the offender's background and character to
warrant the suspicion that he will reoffend. The emphasis at this stage is on
actuarial rather than clinical methods and the inquiries may be performed by
evaluators with only modest, or even no, clinical training. 63 A review of the
offender's file alone may suffice to weed him out. In Illinois, for example, 1,968 of
the 2,125 offenders evaluated during the first 21 months of the state's law's
operation (i.e., 92-93%) were found not to require further processing, 1,683 on a
review solely of their record, with only 442 (21%) deemed to merit the luxury of an
interview.' This high rate of first-step screen outs is a constant throughout the
states that have SVP laws. California referred 731 of its first 2,983 screens (25%),
but the 2,983 total constitutes a second pool already, culled from the roughly 25,000
screened since the program's inception by the California Department of
Corrections' Board of Prison Terms. 65 Kansas screened out 1,985 of its first 2,200
potential SVP cases (90%), referring on the remaining 215 (10%);' Arizona data
show an aberrationally high referral rate, but even there a healthy 157 out of 210
(75%) were immediately dismissed.67 Whatever the precise mechanisms or the
number and sequence of steps used in these first-stage evaluations, it seems likely,
highly likely in fact, that these outcome percentages are driven in part by
considerations other than purely clinical ones. Such other considerations would
include economics (evaluation costs, ultimately treatment and even legal resource
limitations) as well as more qualitative policy concerns on the order of what the
public will accept in terms of social risk versus the cost of containing it, and even

E.

60. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
61. See representative statutes supra note 58.
62. See, e.g., 725 I.L STAT. 207/10(c)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
63. Several states use standard, actuarially-focused instruments for the initial corrections-based screening,
including Wisconsin's Sex Offender Risk Instrument and its End ofConfinement Case Review Board instrument,
and Minnesota's Sex Offender Screening Tool.
64. See data provided by the Illinois Department of Human Services at a Community Providers Conference
in Chicago to attendees (Nov. 4, 1999) (on file with author).
65. See letter from George Bukowski, Chief, Sex Offender Commitment Program, California Dept. of
Mental Health, to Samuel Jan Brakel (Oct. 2, 1998) (on file with author). Dr. Douglas Tucker, a Berkeley-based
psychiatrist who performs SVP evaluations for the state, was the first to alert this writer to the fact that the referrals
in the officially-presented California data were a small subtotal of a much larger number already filtered out by the
Department of Corrections. He estimated the latter total to be in the area of 27,000-28,000 as of February 1999.
See letter from Dr. Douglas Tucker to Samuel Jan Brakel (Feb. 2, 1999) (on file with author).
66. See letter from Terry Gross, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, State of Kansas
to Samuel Jan Brakel (Nov. 17, 1998) (on file with author).
67. See letter from Gene Messer, Arizona Community Protection and Treatment Center, Ariz. Dep't of
Health Services to Samuel Jan Brakel (Sept. 15, 1998) (on file with author).
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stated legislative estimations or aspirations that the number of ultimately
committable offenders be small.
The relatively small percentage of cases that are not weeded out at the first
evaluation stage are bound over to the prosecutorial machinery of either the state
or the county of the offender's residence, or where he committed the crime.6" The
decision for the next steps in the process to be initiated against the offender remains
discretionary. The state's attorney or district attorney may file a probable cause
petition; some petitions, despite their formal filing, may not be pursued; in addition,
a judge makes an independent ruling on probable cause. 69 Nevertheless, the drop-off
rate here is far less than it is at the first-stage screening. A case flow chart provided
by the California Department of Mental Health-more detailed than what is
available from any other SVP state-gives a picture of a case's progression, both
in terms of the procedural steps involved and the quantitative attrition at each
juncture.7 °
Once the court finds that there is probable cause that the offender is committable
71
under the SVP statute, it orders him to be removed to a special detention facility,
typically run by the state's department of mental health. The facility may even be
the same as the place where committed sex offenders are treated, though the detainees presumably are separated from the patients, and they are not to be treated.72
While in special detention, the offender typically receives a second, this time far
more thorough, evaluation in preparation for what will now be a full-blown trial on
whether he is committable.73 The evaluations are usually performed by the state's
mental health personnel, though local judges in some areas reportedly are requiring
independent evaluators. Though there is little precise information on the outcome
of these second-stage evaluations, final case outcome statistics (i.e., number of
offenders ultimately committed) suggest there is comparatively little drop-off at this
point and that an ample majority are found by the evaluators to meet the
commitment criteria. 74 In most states there is relatively little time-too little,
according to critics-for this evaluation process to be completed, as the statutes
mandate that the trial begin no more than a short interval (45 days is typical) after
the probable cause determination. 5
As indicated, the trial is intended to be a full-blown proceeding. Though the
proceedings are nominally civil, most of the rules of evidence applicable to a
68. See, e.g., 725 ILL. STAT. 207/15(a) (West Supp. 1999) (stating that "[a] petition alleging that a person
is... sexually violent... may be filed by... [t]he Attorney General [or] the state's Attorney of the county in
which the person was convicted of a sexually violent offense.").
69. See id. 207/15 (a) & /30 (a).
70. See Chartinfra p. 94, California Dept. of Mental Health (DMH), Sex Offender Commitment Program
(SOCP)(visited Dec. 28, 1999) <http'J/www.drnh.cahwnet.gov/socp/ff.html> [hereinafter DMH Chart].
71. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. 207/30 (a) & (c) (West Supp. 1999).
72. In minois, a correctional facility at Sheridan, some 70 miles southwest of Chicago, doubles as both the
place of detention and treatment for the State's SVPs. Its rules, regulations and personnel are of the Department
of Human Services, Office of Mental Health--distinct from the State's correctional regime as well as from its civil
mental health provisions. See 725 ILL. STAT. 207/50 (West Supp. 1999).
73. See, e.g., id. 207/30(c) & 207/35(a).
74. The California data (see infra p. 32) show 20% more negative clinical evaluations at this point than
positive ones. But referrals-to-commitments rates in other states imply much higher positive evaluation rates.
75. See, e.g., 725 ILL. STAT. 207/35(a) (West Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a04 (Supp. 1998)
(providing 75 days); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.050 (West Supp. 1999).
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criminal trial apply.7 6 The offender is entitled to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, have his own witnesses, including his own expert (paid for by
the state, if he is indigent); proof of committability must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt; he may remain silent at the trial and presumably may refuse to
cooperate in the state's evaluation of him (though he may forfeit the right to his own
expert if he does so); and finally, he can request a jury trial whose verdict the SVP
law requires to be unanimous (as distinct from other civil jury trials which may in
some states be decided by a non-unanimous vote).77
Available figures reveal a mixed picture regarding the success rate for the State
in the full-fledged commitment hearings. Discerning/disentangling the reasons for
the variations from state to state requires further investigations and/or more
complete data than are currently available. The highest referral-to-commitment rates
are found in Minnesota and Wisconsin, which commit 53% and 49%, respectively,
of the cases that survive the first screening.7" California to date has committed only
221 of its 731 referrals (30%), but 30% of its 355 probable cause cases.7 9 In
addition, the large number of cases in which probable cause hearings or full trials
are still pending in California (66 and 149 cases, respectively) means that even the
54% figure is not final.8" Of the states that have substantial experience with their
SVP laws, Kansas and Washington have the lowest commitment rates, 19% and
14% of the referrals, respectively.8" Any attempt to calculate commitment rates for
states with newer laws is futile. The results would be meaningless, as it takes time
to straighten out the kinks in the process, to fend off the initial legal challenges and
get the evaluation and trial machinery into full gear. For example, Illinois' law went
into effect on January 1, 1998, but eight months later only three offenders had been
committed, two of whom had chosen not to contest.8 2 The State had conspicuously
withdrawn its very first case and lost the second one at trial.8 3 Subsequently, ten
more filings were withdrawn by the Attorney General as not winnable and an
additional four were lost; 39 offenders were in detention awaiting trial. Today, a
year later, Illinois' SVP system is closer to being on track with a total of 32
commitments, but still an outsized population of 57 detained while awaiting trial.8 4
Commitments are starting to add up even though the laws are still quite new and
the numbers screened out are high. This is because the numbers of sex offenders

76. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. 207/35(b).
77.

See, e.g., id. 207/25.

78. See letter from Bonnie Lee, Minn. Dept. of Human Services to Samuel Jan Brakel (Dec. 16, 1998) (on
file with author) (providing Minnesota data); letter from Linda Harris, State of Wisconsin Dept. of Health and
Family Services to Samuel Jan Brakel (Oct. 2, 1998) (on file with author) (providing Wisconsin information). Some
of the Minnesota data were updated by Ms. Lee in a letter of Nov. 9, 1999.
79. See letter from Bukowski, supranote 65, and DMH Chart, infra p. 94.
80. See supra note 79.
81. There were 40 commitments in Kansas and only 44 commitments in Washington after eight years. See
letter from Gross, supra note 66 and accompanying text (for the Kansas figure); Washington data were provided
by Mark Selig, Superintendent, State of Washington Department of Social and Health Services, in a letter, plus
attachments, to Samuel Jan Brakel (Oct. 11 1999) (on file with author). The low absolute number of commitments
suggests that the explanation is not found in mere definitional differences as to what constitutes a referral.
82. E-mail from Michael Howie, Illinois Department of Human Services to Thomas Haywood, Isaac Ray
Center (Oct. 15, 1998) (on file with author).
83. See Christi Parsons, Jury Out on Sex-Offender Law, Ctu. TRlB., June 28, 1998 § 1, at 1, 12.
84. See id.; see supranote 64 for source of most recent Illinois data.
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coming out of the prisons or related custodial institutions are high, especially in
populous states. In California, as shown, almost 3,000 offenders have been closely
screened in the first three-plus years of its SVP law's operation, while a much larger
number of cases yet-some 25,000-have been reviewed in a more cursory
fashion. 5 Illinois has reviewed as many as 2,125 cases in the first 21 months.8 6
Much larger numbers of commitments will be generated shortly in these states than
the current 221 and 32, respectively. Minnesota and Wisconsin, with 154 and 130
87
commitments, respectively, currently have among the largest commitment totals.
Their laws have been operational since 1994. Kansas and Washington, as reported,
have low commitment totals (40 and 44), the latter state seemingly determined to
hold the line against any pressure to confine larger numbers.8 8 Arizona reports 26
commitments as of October, 1999.89 North Dakota has 6.'0 As of the third quarter
in the calendar year of 1999, the total number of SVP commitments in the U.S.
stood at around 630, but with new states on the SVP bandwagon and next-to-no
releases anywhere, including in states with mature systems, one can expect dramatic
growth in this total in the years to come.
F.

TreatmentProvisions
Confirming the low priority placed on treatment as well as the relative dearth of
knowledge about treating sex offenders, the SVP statutes tend to have little to say
on this issue. There is almost complete silence when it comes to treatment
modalities, routines or standards, though it can be argued that as medical matters
these are not things about which legislatures should speak." Some SVP laws
provide for so-called outpatient commitment as an alternative to inpatient treatment
for offenders who have been found to meet the statutory criteria. 9 The original SVP
statute (Washington's) and others modeled on it contemplate commitment (to a
secure facility) only.93 One can be sure, however, that courts will use this
disposition only in the rarest of cases. Not many judges are likely to be either very
confident or comfortable about prescribing non-custodial treatment for someone
who has just been found to be a sexually dangerous predator. Wisconsin officials
report 12 outpatient dispositions (against 127 commitments)--a sizable number that

85. See supra note 65.
86. See supra note 64.
87. See supra note 78. As mentioned previously, an update of the total number of comminents for
Minnesota was provided on Nov. 9,1999. The Wisconsin total provided by Ms. Linda Harris on Oct. 2, 1998 was
127. FrrCH, supra note 42, provides the 130 figure as current for March 31, 1999 in tbl. 3. More recent figures are

not available.
88. See supra note 81.

89. See letter from Gene Messer, Arizona Community Protection and Treatment Center, Ariz. Dep't of
Health Services to Samuel Jan Brakel (Oct. 14, 1999) (updating some of the data provided in Sept. 15, 1998 letter,
supra note 67).

90. Telephone interview with Dr. Alan Broadhead, Medical Director, North Dakota State Hospital (Nov.
10, 1999).
91. Indeed, there is a separate child molester parole statute in California, which does get into the therapeutic
details, prescribing mandatory medroyprogesterone acetate treatment for second-time offenders, which has for that
very reason drawn much criticism. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1999).
92. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. 207/40(b)(2).
93. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060 (West 1992).
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may dwindle as placement problems become apparent." Arizona has an outpatient
treatment model that may present the "happy medium." It operates a formal Less
Restrictive Alternative Program where SVP patients can work or go to school
during the stay under close supervision: 10 of its 26 commitments have been judged
eligible for this.95 Under the SVP statutes, when the outpatient disposition is used,
the courts can condition the offender's continual freedom from custodial treatment
upon his participation in a wide range of community services, counseling and
supervision programs." In this respect, the SVP laws resemble conditional release
and parole-style provisions applicable to other offender populations, such as
NGRIs,97 convicted prisoners and even convicted defendants given non-custodial
terms, i.e., probationers. As indicated by the Wisconsin experience above, SVP laws
also partake of the NGRI experience in that the attempt to place the offenders in
community facilities is likely to engender stiff community resistance-a resistance
stoked and fueled by the registration/notification laws.9"
Review and Release Provisions
The SVP laws call for (or are usually interpreted to call for) indefinite
confinement until the offender is sufficiently improved so that he no longer meets
the SVP criteria." If nothing else, such open-ended commitment is consistent with
the treatment rationale articulated in Jones v. United States"° ' vis-a-vis NGRIs. All
the statutes, however, have sets of review and release provisions guaranteeing that
the retention of committed individuals is periodically, if not continually, justified."0 '
It can be argued that the commitment is essentially determinate or finite where such
provisions require the state to initiate the review procedure and the burden of
proving the need for continued confinement is on the state. Conditional release and
its attendant community-based obligations are also part of this section of the laws."°
G.

94. Seven of the twelve were actually residing in the community, but five remained on indefinite
institutional hold while DMH officials searched high and low for a place that would take them. See letter from
Harris, supra note 78. The beginning ofa movement was already afoot to eliminate altogether the existing judicial
authority to order outpatient commitment without some reasonable (six months) inpatient institutionalization to
precede it. See id.
95. See letter from Messer, supra note 89.
96. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. 207/40(b)(3) (stating that the conditional release plan "shall address the person's
need, if any, for supervision, counseling, mediation, community support services, residential services, vocational
services, and alcohol or other drug abuse treatment").
97. For one discussion of the characteristics of these NGRI conditional release laws, see Samuel Brakel,
After the Verdict: Dispositional Decisions Regarding Criminal Defendants Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 37
DEPAULL REV. 181 (1988).
98. The aggravation of community resistance by the notification laws is expressly noted by Ms. Harris, the
reporter on the Wisconsin program. See letter from Harris, supra note 78.
99. See, e.g., RL STAT. 207/40(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (1994) (providing for commitment until
the individual's "disorder has so changed that [he] is safe to be at large").
100. 463 U.S. 354 (1983). In Jones, the United States Supreme Court approved the District of Columbia's
law authorizing indefinite commitment of insanity acquittees.
101. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. 207/55(a) (requiring the State to reexamine the offender "within 6 months" after
his commitment and once per year after that). In addition, under 207/55(c). the committing court may order a
reexamination "any time," as may the Secretary of the Department of Human Services, per 207/65(a)(1). Under
207/60(a), the offender may petition the court for a review of his condition after he has been institutionalized for
6 months. The burden of proof for the need to continue to detain the offender is on the State. See id. 207/60)(d).
102. See, e.g., id. 207/60(e).
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Some of the rights applicable to trials, such as counsel, confrontation, own experts,
etc., are extended to offenders
up for review, especially the periodically mandated
10 3
state-initiated reviews.
Experience with the SVP laws is in most states too short to expect to find
meaningful release figures or patterns over time. Washington, which, with its
pioneer statute enacted in 1990, has had a considerably longer run than most states,
and has to date released only two sexually violent predators."° However,
Washington's commitment total is distinctively low. More people in, more people
out-at least eventually. The emphasis goes on "eventually," because both political
and therapeutic realities militate strongly against early release of offenders
committed under the SVP laws.
H. The FirstConstitutionalTest: Kansas v. Hendricks
As indicated, one of the state SVP laws was tested at the highest judicial level
in 1997. In sustaining the Kansas law against the major constitutional challenges in
Kansas v. Hendricks, 5 the U.S. Supreme Court gave the green light to politicians
in other states to embark on a similar legal course in dealing with the sex offender
problem. And it assured officials in states where the laws were already in place that
they were operating on constitutionally safe, if not solid, ground. There is still
ample room for other substantive, procedural and operational challenges to the laws
in both state and federal forums, but Hendricks does conclusively dispose of two
or three major constitutional issues.' °6
Written by Justice Thomas, the Hendricks opinion has generated ample
commentary, most of it negative.0 7 Much of this negativism, however, reflects
political/philosophical opposition to the legislation. The decision itself and the
reasoning used to arrive at it are readily defensible from a legal standpoint, even if
they may leave in some mouths somewhat of a bad moral aftertaste.
Hendricks, or rather the lawyers paid to represent him, challenged his
commitment under Kansas' SVP law on the following legal grounds: substantive
due process, double jeopardy and the ex post facto doctrine-4echnical concepts,
maybe even arcane to non-lawyers, but well within our legal traditions. Legal
technicalities, by the way, were all Hendricks had to go on, for when it came to the
equities or the societal interest he, like so many other offenders whose names grace
our landmark cases, did not have much of a case for his release: he had a long
history of molesting children, including his own stepdaughter and stepson, and he
himself admitted he would stop molesting children only when he died. 0

103. See, e.g., id 207/55(a).
104. See Rael Jean Isaac, Put Sex Predators Behind Bars, Not on the Couch, WAiL ST. J., May 8, 1998, at
A14.
105. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
106. See id (holding that Kansas' Sexually Violent Prdator Act did not violate the Constitution's double
jeopardy prohibition or its ban on ex post facto lawmaking).
107. A recent article by Kimberly Dorsett is emblematic of this sort of negativism. The piece opines that the
Hendricks decision "is a reflection of overwhelming public pressure on the Court." See Dorsett, supra note 39, at
159.
108. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355.
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The crux of the substantive due process argument was that the Kansas law's
central commitment criterion-that the offender be found to have an underlying

mental abnormality-failed to satisfy the asserted requirement that an individual be
mentally ill (and dangerous) before he can be committed to a mental facility,'
There is indeed a strong line of legal doctrine matching an equally strong
philosophical tradition in American jurisprudence that the State cannot confine
someone just because he is dangerous, except in very limited situations and under
strictly prescribed procedures, e.g., United States v. Salerno." To do so--on a
showing of dangerousness alone- constitutes an impermissible form of preventive

detention. The State can imprison someone for a criminal act, but for an act only,
not for a condition or status, much less one that has predictive elements."' It may
commit to a mental (nonpenal) facility someone who is dangerous, but only if that
dangerousness is accompanied, if not caused, by some type or degree of mental
impairment."' Hendricks' contention was that only mental illness would qualify as
the sufficient accompanying condition, basing his point in part on the fact that the
civil commitment laws of most states and of Kansas, in particular, make verbatim
use of this term." 3
Justice Thomas rejected this contention with relative ease." 4 Stating that the term
mental illness was "devoid of talismanic significance,""' 5 he pointed out that both
the statutory law of civil commitment and the courts' interpretations of these laws
used a "variety of expressions to describe the mental condition of those properly
subject to civil confinement.""' 6 He might have added that in criminal law the same
is true, with legal significance attaching to any number of mental condition
descriptions other than mental illness. 17 Moreover, Thomas noted that defining

109. See id. at 356. At least one notable jurist has observed that the term due process denotes proper
procedure and that the whole idea of substantive due process-like a couple of other famous phrases in law, i.e.,
"deliberate indifference" and "all deliberate speed"-is an oxymoron, at best, and possibly worse, an invitation to
judges of activist inclination to impose all sorts of requirements and limits on the states that are found nowhere in
the Constitution. See Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F. 2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985).
110. 481 U.S. 739, 740 (1987) (authorizing no-bail detention of people charged with serious offenses if
necessary to "reasonably assure... the safety of any other person and the community."). However, this pre-trial
confinement is strictly limited by the requirements of speedy trial statutes, as the Court emphasized. See id.
111. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
112. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (holding that an offender acquitted by reason of insanity
and institutionalized in a mental facility therefore cannot be kept there once his sanity is restored, even if he
remains certifiably dangerous).
113. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358. Intuitive constitutionalists may see an equal protection claim lurking
in this argument as well.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 359.
116. Id.
117. The primary insanity defense tests in the U.S. refer to mental disease or defect as the threshold exonerating condition. This, however, has variously been argued and/or interpreted to include not only major mental illness
such as schizophrenia and evident psychotic conditions, but also various personality disorders, (e.g., antisocial
personality disorder), syndromes such as compulsive gamblers syndrome, post-traumatic stress, including
subspecies thereof, such as Vietnam Veterans Syndrome, Battered Women's Syndrome, and so forth. In addition,
there is the more functionally-oriented concept of incompetency in criminal law that requires the postponement
of proceedings and/or the invalidation of decisions already made because the proceedings in which they were made
were allegedly tainted by the defendant's mental impairment. The recent case of Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389
(1993), suggests that the test for all these criminal incompetencies may be pretty much the same, but the underlying
condition that triggers the inquiry can be anything from a major mental illness, to low IQ, poor socialization,
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medical terms for legal purposes is a classic legislative task, to which courts
generally should defer."' Finally, Hendricks' point was substantially weakened, in
Thomas' estimation, by the fact that the psychiatric profession itself classifies his
undisputed diagnosis-pedophilia-as a "serious mental disorder," if not illness." 9
The double jeopardy and ex post facto claims advanced by Hendricks were, if
anything, even easier to dispose of for Thomas. Here, the 11-year old Allen v.
Illinois12 0 precedent, and the credibility it restored to the civil/criminal distinction,
proved eminently serviceable. Both double jeopardy-one can be tried only once
for a violation of the law-and the ex postfacto prohibition--one cannot be held
to account under laws made after the fact-apply to the criminal law only.' 2 ' A
ruling that the SVP law was civil would be the end of Hendricks' argument. Allen
had held, with respect to Illinois' old sex offender law, that the legislature's stated
categorization and purpose of the law as civil were deserving of substantial
deference and the mere fact that the law came with certain gratuitous criminal lawstyle safeguards and related accoutrements (thanks to Specht v. Patterson)hardly
put it in the criminal category." The Court had found enough of the civil substance
and objective in the old law to legitimize the civil label, and it had no trouble
coming to the same conclusion in regard to the new, but in most relevant respects
similar, SVP law.
Incidental to the due process issue as well as the civil/criminal dichotomy,
Thomas still had to deal with the SVP law's minimal treatment focus--on paper
and, according to evidence brought forth in the Hendricks' trial, in practice. He
did this under two alternative assumptions. The first posited that treatment was not
available under the Kansas law because treatment was not (medically) possible for
the category of offenders coming under its purview-a not wholly implausible
assumption."' Thomas' answer was that the law could be sustained even if the
assumption were true. He pointed to a long history of civil detention and
segregation of dangerous individuals (the mentally ill in earlier days, those suffering
from untreatable, highly contagious diseases, etc.), when incapacitation was the
primary and even sole goal simply because medical science had not yet developed
an effective therapy or cure. 26 Thomas concluded that the laws under which these
non-therapeutic detentions were accomplished were
never thought to be punitive
27
and there was no reason to so treat the SVP laws.
The alternative assumption tried out by Thomas was one under which treatment
might be possible but is relegated to a secondary or, in his words, "ancillary

emotional deficiency, cultural disadvantage, or even amnesia.
118. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359.
119. See id.at 360.
120. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
121. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369.
122. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 368.
123. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62.
124. See id at 365.
125. In fact, this appeared to be the finding of the Kansas Supreme Court and its reason for invalidating the
law. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365.
126. See id. at 366.
127. See id.
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purpose"12 8 -i.e., treatment as an afterthought to the primary motive of continued
confinement, as the history of the SVP laws' enactment in fact suggests. Thomas
found no greater problem with this scenario than the first one. So long as the statute
makes explicit reference to the treatment purpose/duty, judges may (perhaps even
must, absent a formal record to the contrary) conclude that treatment will be
provided."" The fact that the treatment offered to Hendricks himself appeared to
have been "somewhat meager"' 3 was hardly fatal. Meager is not the same as none.
Besides, Hendricks was "the first person committed under the Act," and the more
recent evidence was that Kansas' treatment efforts had come a long way since. 3 '
VI. BACK TO THE FUTURE?: POSSIBLE DEMISE OF THE SVP LAWS
Irrespective of how one reads Hendricks and its particular legal implications,
some larger questions remain, such as where the SVP laws are headed. The current
trend may be the beginning of a national, if not international, movement of
substantial duration toward post-incarceration confinement and treatment of
society's worst sex offenders. Or, maybe we are merely witnessing a short-term
overreaction to what are ultimately rare, if exceedingly painful, events-a societal
spasm of sorts that by definition has no lasting grip on our public policy or
jurisprudence. We could be in the midst of a real revolution on how to deal with the
problem of sexual deviancy or, alternatively, merely observing a short-lived
bandwagon effect hitched to a single ill-considered policy choice made eight years
ago by one exasperated state legislature. There may still be ample room for the
pendulum to swing upward or it might already be at the peak of its trajectory and
be ready to come down. In another few years, we could be back to the future, so to
speak, back to where we were in terms of managing this "problem" in pre-1990 days
or even the pre-1930s. There are signals that provide support for prognostications
in either direction.
The SVP laws have generally proved easy to pass, or better, difficult to resist.
They have been presented as political no-brainers. Against a backdrop of public
opinion inflamed by a spate of reports of horrible sex crimes-what legislator
would come out against a bill that promised to lock up the perpetrators of these
crimes, potentially for life? Even so, SVP legislation has been rejected or
withdrawn in 21 states in the last couple of years. 3 1 In states that have operating
laws, second thoughts cannot be put off indefinitely, especially if experience with
the laws has been less than favorable. Finally, there was always opposition-some
of it from surprising sources-whose spokesmen can be counted on to seize upon
such bad news as may materialize to restate the oppositional case.
The civil liberties lawyers have always opposed (reflexively, their critics would
say) the SVP laws because the laws permit the state to take away liberty in its most
obvious, conspicuous sense. 3 The fact that the law may at the same time preserve

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 367.
See id.
Id. at 367.
See id. at367-68.
See FrcH,supra note 42.
See, e.g., LaFond, supra note 39; Dorsett, supra note 39.
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liberty in some less conspicuous way for the targeted class and/or for groups of
people, including society at large, who are not the direct targets of the law, tends to
be ignored. But this time, the lawyers have allies whose political weight, if thrown
fully behind the oppositional cause, will be significant. Many respected psychiatrists, including leaders of organized psychiatry, are on record as being against the
laws. 13 4 Their reasons center on what was earlier referred to as the laws' alleged
hypocrisy--the misuse of the treatment rationale, including the methods, objectives
and even the institutions of psychiatry, in the service of other ends (i.e., incapacitation and maybe even further punishment).' 35 In addition, there are also what are
today known as consumer groups-people who have experienced psychiatric
problems personally or in their families-who are becoming increasingly vociferous
in their opposition to the SVP laws and the laws' systemic effects. There are
organizations such as the Alliance for the Mentally Ill (AMI-composed primarily
of families that have experienced mental illness in their midst), with chapters in
every state as well as a national organization (NAMI), whose members are
investigating the impact of SVP commitments on resources for the "truly"
mentally
36
ill and who are lobbying for the laws' repeal at every opportunity.
The AMI group in California (CAMI) is among the most active in ferreting out
the SVP laws' negative effects. Its focus of attack is on bed-space and cost allocations, and it has documented some compelling facts that can be used to bolster the
case against the SVP laws. 37 The group's starting position is that mental hospitals
are for people with brain disorders (the true mentally ill) and that the sex offenders
committed under the new law do not belong.'38 In California, nevertheless, the SVPs
are currently placed in the same institutions as the mentally ill and they are not
adequately segregated from that population.' 39 SVPs are housed in separate units but
there is evidently considerable mixing in the common areas, much to the disadvantage of the mentally ill patients. Not only is housing space for the latter impinged
upon, as well as other services and resources, by the generally more aggressive
SVPs (use of law libraries, infirmary and dental services, grievance mechanisms,
.etc.), but the arrangement also creates the opportunity for manipulation of mental
patients by SVPs, not to mention abuse and outright assaults (some of which have
been documented).""4 The SVP numbers compiled by CAMI are alarming,
especially in their potential for growth and concomitant displacement of resources
134. See, e.g., Robert M. Wettstein, M.D., A PsychiatricPerspective on Washington's Sexually Violent
PredatorStatute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L REV. 597 (1992); 49 PSYCmATRIC Svcs. 1375 (1998) (announcing that
an "APA Task Force Report Urges Strong Opposition to Laws Committing Sexual Predators to Mental Health
Facilities").
135. See generally supranotes 39 and 134.
136. Typically, psychiatrists and the AMI groups would position themselves in favor of facilitating treatment
directly opposite the civil liberties lawyers, so this is an unexpected new alliance.
137. While there is cause for concern, it may be more in terms of projections than current facts. E.g., at the
moment, SVP beds comprise only 6% of California's state hospital beds. See official state data from Dr. Douglas
Tucker, Berkeley-based psychiatrist to Samuel Jan Brakel (Oct. 25, 1999) (on file with author).
138. See letters from Carla Jacobs, California Alliance for the Mentally IMI
(CAMI) to California State Senator
Daniel Boatwright (July 2, 1996), and to sociologist and legal/political commentator Rael Jean Isaac (undated) (on
file with author).
139. See id. The CAMI assertions are made with particular reference to California's Atascadero State
Hospital.
140. See id.
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for the mentally ill. At the time of the California Act's passage there were, by the
CAMI advocates' count, somewhere between 8,000 and 11,000 sex offenders in the
state's prisons, expected to be released (and screened for probable cause) at a rate
of some 2,000-3,000 per year, 4' some 5%-10% of whom might ultimately be found
committable. 42 The reality has been somewhat less alarming, in most respects. The
numbers screened annually have been higher (though they will drop dramatically
once the backlog is cleared), but the total commitments-so far-have been
substantially lower.' Evaluation costs were pegged by CAMI at some $80,000 per
individual.'4" The actual data are that the state spent some $3.5 million on
evaluations and testimony in fiscal 1998-99. 4 -' Then there were the housing and
treatment costs for the committed SVPs which, at the CAMI-presented estimate of
$107,000-112,000 per person per year, about five times the cost of imprisonment
and near the top of the range for mentally disordered offenders treated in the state
hospitals, $57,000-$138,000, would threaten to break the bank even at the lowest
of projected totals.'" These figures have proved accurate enough. The state spent
$31,166,000 on SVP treatment in 1998-99, $107,000 per individual. 47 The total
yearly cost of the SVP program at this point is thus around $35 million and rising.14
Currently, it is about 2% of the state's total budget for mental health services, 49 but
that fraction will increase. The state's own projections have 1,100 SVPs in
residential treatment by the year 2009, at a total cost of about $118 million." ° There
are plans to build a new, separate SVP facility, which at 1,500 beds is projected to
cost $300 million.'' CAMI advocates fear that what might result is the collapse of
the state's less than bountiful support-political, moral and monetary-for the true
mentally ill, civil and forensic. They fear that such a result might even be
welcomed-surreptitiously, if not perversely-by a "dying mental health
bureaucracy" ultimately pleased to be provided with a new market.
These economic facts, if they materialize and become known, will put enormous
pressure on the state legislatures to rethink the SVP approach. And, there is still
plenty of play in the litigation pen, Hendricks notwithstanding, to help undermine
the viability of the laws. Lawyers for the offenders will continue exploiting to their
advantage the mixed civil-criminal characteristics of the laws. They will argue for
every criminal law or criminal law-style safeguard not explicitly put to rest by the
Hendricksprecedent. For example, lawyers for an Illinois sex offender successfully
challenged on this ground the SVP statute's failure to provide for a jury trial in
discharge proceedings.' At the same time they will, if needed, blithely adopt

141. See id.
142. See id.

143. See DMH Chart, infra p. 94.
144. See letters from Jacobs, supra note 138.
145. See state data from Tucker, supra note 137.
146. See letters from Jacobs, supra note 138. The SVP treatment costs in other states range from a low of
$40,000 per capita in Arizona to $155,000 in the District of Columbia. See FrrcH, supranote 42.
147. See state data from Tucker, supra note 137.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See Terry Wilson, Judge OKs Limit for Sex Offender, Ci. TRiB., Oct. 7, 1998, § 2, at 3.
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Hendricks' civil designation stamp to get procedural mileage or obstructionist
ammunition from that side of the dichotomy. 5 a
Standard of proof issues also remain eminently usable by lawyers wishing to void
the SVP laws' operations or effects. Moreover, the laws may be vulnerable. It will
not be long before a clever defense lawyer will make the argument, if it hasn't been
made already, that no one evaluation methodology nor any combination of
methodologies can satisfy the legal standard"- beyond a reasonable doubt-the
state must meet in predicting that the offender is a sexually violent predator "highly
likely" to reoffend. One can only guess what a quantified equivalent of this doublebarreled standard may be-75% likelihood?; 85%? But, there is enough empirical
evidence out there to raise real doubt that clinical, actuarial, plethysmographic,
polygraphic or visual reactive testing (the Abel Screen), either singly, or in
combination, can, in general, yield the degree of certainty about the matter at issue
required by the law. Whether that would be enough for a trial court to refuse to
commit in the individual case is another question. Whether an appellate court would
for this reason invalidate the whole SVP commitment process is an inference yet
further removed, but thereby not necessarily implausible.
The laws also remain vulnerable to treatment-oriented challenges. Hendricks
merely held that it is constitutionally permissible for a state to commit individuals
who are not amenable to treatment or who receive little treatment even if amenable.
State courts ruling on different provisions or principles-e.g., a right to
treatment-may come to a different conclusion, especially if evidence of the
government's neglect or ineptitude is compelling. Washington's treatment program,
for example, has been found wanting and is currently operating under a courtappointed special master, which is akin to being in receivership for financial
irresponsibility.'5 5 It is also no longer mandatory, with 28 of its 44 committed
offenders participating, according to the latest count. 156 Give or take a few other
states in similar legal straits, and one would have substantial momentum for
jettisoning the whole business.
Whether treatment of the typical SVP is in fact a workable, success-yielding
proposition is not clear, but the answer may be almost beside the point. Though
research findings remain less than conclusive, there is at least anecdotal evidence
that the best combination therapies-anti-androgen drugs plus insight talk and
conditioning-can be effective, though not undifferentiated, across-the-board, for
all varieties of sexual deviancy or for equal duration. 57 The question remains how
153. In Illinois, again, an appellate court recently ruled at the urgings of defense attorneys that the latter may

videotape the state's psychological evaluations of theirclients, because such documentation is permitted under the

civil rules, though not in criminal cases. See Lorraine Forte, Judge Will Allow Exam of Molesterto Be Videotaped,
CHIC. SuN-TIMES, Mar. 4, 1998, at 28.
154. See Dennis M. Doren, Recidivism Base Rates, Predictionsof Sex OffenderRecidivism, and the "Sexual
Predator"Commitment Laws, 16 BEHAv. Sc. L 97 (1998); Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal
Standardfor Predictionsof Dangerousnessin Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings,3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y.

& L 33 (1997); Eric S. Janus, PreventingSexual Violence: Setting PrincipledConstitutionalBoundarieson Sex
Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L J. 157, 197-208 (1996).
155. See Isaac,supra note 104.
156. See Washington data from Selig, supra note 81.
157. Articles on sex offender treatment efficacy include some of the following: H.M. Kravitz et al.,
Medroxyprogesterone Treatmentfor Paraphiliacs,23 BulL AM. ACAD. PSYcHIATRY LAw 19 (1995); F.S. Berlin,
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the courts, the legislatures or the public will deal with the facts on treatment
success, whatever they show. It is unknown what a politically acceptable 5 '
recidivism rate for sex offenders or a treatment-induced drop therein might be. The
public's tolerance level vis-a-vis the SVP population and the comparative successes
and failings of the costly treatment programs set up for this population also remains
to be seen. Beyond that, it is unlikely that many or any of the states' treatment
programs will have the wherewithal to use the best therapies. The current methods,
especially the drugs, are costly enough. Newer drugs are even more expensive,
likely to be beyond the reach of tax payer-supported programs, not to mention that
they might be considered too experimental from either a medical or, more
compelling, legal liability perspective.'59 Even if, in theory, one could devise a
program that is 100% effective in treating SVPs, that would hardly mean that any
state would in fact have such a program.
VII. CONCLUSION
To predict is not merely to risk being wrong, but usually to assure it. There is one
safe prediction, however: the SVP laws will ultimately prove defective in both the
underinclusive and overinclusive direction-i.e., they will miss committing many
who will reoffend and they will commit an undiscernible number who would not
have reoffended if left free. This basic fact is worth noting, for one, because the
opposing sides tend to see only one or the other failing-not both. It is also worth
noting because it is more than a statistical probability-it is an inevitable function
of the design as well as the considered implementation of the SVP laws.
Perhaps the most glaring illustration of the underinclusiveness of the SVP laws
is Florida's, the most recently enacted exemplar. 6" The law is known as the Jimmy
Ryce Act, after a nine-year-old rape and murder victim whose case provided the
impetus for its passage. The irony is that, had the law been in effect earlier, it would
not have saved the boy because the perpetrator was not a repeat offender and would
not have come within the law's reach.' 6 ' Similarly, one might speculate that one of
the past decade's most notorious sex offenders, Jeffrey Dahmer, who murdered and
sexually mutilated 17 young men, and who himself was killed in a Wisconsin
prison, would have been missed by Wisconsin's SVP scheme, had it been in

Treating Sexual Disorderswith Medroxyprogesterone Acetate, CURRENTS INTERVIEW 5; W.L Marshall, Treatment
Effects on Denial and Minimization in IncarceratedSex Offenders, 32 BEHAV. RES. TILER. 559 (1994); B.K.
Schwartz, Effective Treatment Techniques for Sex Offenders, 22 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 315 (1992); Monique
Richer & M. L Crismon, Pharmacotherapyof Sexual Offenders, 27 ANNALS OF PHARMACOTHERAPY 316 (1993);
L. Rousseau et al., Effect of Combined Androgen Blockade with an LHRH Agonist and Flutamide in One Severe
Case of Male Exhibitionism, 35 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 338 (1990); Martin P. Kafka, M.D. & R. Prentky, Ph.D.,
Fluoxetine Treatment of NonparaphilicSexual Addictions and Paraphiliasin Men, 53 J. CUN PSYCHIATRY 351
(1992); Ariel Rsler, M.D., & Eliezer Witztum, M.D., Treatment of Men with Paraphiliawith a Long-Acting
Analogue of Gonadotropin-ReleasingHormone, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 416 (1998).
158. On the politics of acceptable recidivism rates, see, for example, Jan Brakel, Sampling the MentalHealth
Law Literature:Three Recent Books, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 535, 540 (reviewing T.P. THORNBERRY & J.E.
JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY INSANE: A COMMUNrrY FOLLOW-UP OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS (1979)).

159. See R6sier & witztum, supra note 157 (discussing the most recent chemical treatments and their success
rates).
160. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 916.31 (Supp. 1998).
161. See Isaac, supra note 104.
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existence. Dahmer's first brush with the law was in 1988 for indecent exposure. He
had already killed three times by then." A year later he was arrested for molesting
a 13-year old boy and did his time---one year-in a work-release program (no
confinement). He killed twice more right after that.'63 A law that applies to
incarcerated violent repeat offenders only, and whose stated mission is merely to
capture a small group of the most serious recidivists, is guaranteed to miss more
than a few serious, violent sex offenders-i.e., to fail for its inherent
underinclusiveness.
But the laws will also overinclude.'" One doesn't have to be a civil liberties
lawyer to know that the pressure to avoid mistakes of omission, so to speak, will in
an undetermined and probably undeterminable number of cases result in
overpredictions of recidivism. The system, or better the various officials and
professionals charged with the laws' implementation, will at times be driven to
approve the commitment of the so-called false positive. Better safe than sorry will
be the understandable motto, especially in the context of great public alarm about
the types of offenders for whom the laws were written.
With all these negatives about the SVP laws-practical and conceptual---are they
destined to disappear in short order? That is not a forgone conclusion. One reason
is that the alternatives are singularly unappealing. Doing nothing will not do: the
public, we have learned, will not stand for it. Doing it honestly, i.e., without the
"hypocrisy" of mental health commitments, has its own drawbacks. There are two
possible ways. The law could go for straight, unadorned, unapologetic, preventive
detention of those who pose serious risks. 65 The problem with that is, our legal
tradition-including some quite recent U.S. Supreme Court affirmations of that
tradition-will not stand for it.'" That leads us back to the beginning of the
pendulum's stroke: invoking the criminal law for those who have committed
criminal acts of sexual deviancy. This time, we say we do it right-appropriate
retribution; adequate incapacitation; and truth in sentencing (no more good-time
reductions, no parole, no early releases, etc.). 67 But the flaws in that approach
hardly need telling. Statutory sentencing law is by definition, if not by purpose, bad
at differentiating, calibrating. It operates like a sledgehammer. Where there is no
discretion for judges, juries or, later, parole boards to individualize the law's
application, we will wind up with draconian sentences for too many who do not

162. See Tom Mathews & K. Springer, Secrets of a Serial Killer, NEWsWEEK, Feb. 3, 1992, at 44,47.
163. See id.

164. This, of course, is the central grievance of the civil libertarians and their clients, especially true falsepositives (assuming the falsity of these negative predictions can be definitively determined).
165. See Janus, supra note 154. Janus is aware that the philosophy of prevention-straight up, so to speak,
rests on a shaky foundation and that the United States Supreme Court only recently rejected this approach in
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). See infra note 166.
166. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 83 (holding that the State lacks the authority to continue to hold in confinement
an NGRI who is not or no longer mentally ill, even if still dangerous). The holding is in considerable tension with
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (allowing the hospitalization of an NGRI on the basis of the verdict

alone-i.e., without proof of current mental illness or dangerousness, as would be required for someone proposed
for civil commitment).
167. This would be in tune with the most recent trends in sentencing generally. However, the downside of
these trends is receiving growing publicity and we may see the corresponding legislative reaction before too long.
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deserve or need such harsh treatment. 16' Apart from the injustice, this will also
wreak havoc in our already overcrowded prisons. Finally, while the old SVP laws
still exist in some jurisdictions and may be relied upon in particular to remedy the
putative underinclusiveness flaws of the SVP statutes, it is not easy to see them
resurrected as an adequate substitute for the new laws.
Despite the conceptual and practical problems they may have, the SVP laws do
have one major advantage: they call for very careful, expert-aided, offense
calibration and offender identification. Surely, that is better than the absence of
such effort. Then, finally, there is the maligned treatment angle-it has a positive
side as well. No matter how unpromising and inappropriate in some respects, or
how unwanted and unneeded in some cases, there will be an opportunity to do it
right, to provide real benefits and good outcomes, in others. More importantly,
perhaps, is the opportunity for systematic treatment experience and research that the
laws bring. It could be argued that this prospect neither justifies the law nor its
administration on a captive population. On the other hand, given a law passed by
a duly constituted legislature and found sustainable by the country's highest court,
why not make the best of it? To be able to build a store of diagnostic and treatment
information on this population is of considerable value. Even if its members do not
present or represent classic mental health problems, they do constitute a serious
social-behavioral problem. To learn to deal with that is of no small moment,
whatever the precise rubric--civil, criminal, treatment, incapacitation-under
which it is done. In sum, the laws may ultimately, and perhaps paradoxically, to the
extent they are seen as regressive, be the source for much-needed progress in this
difficult field.

168. For the trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases on this problem, see Rummel v. Estele, 445 U.S.
263 (1980), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), and Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
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